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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to document and study the evaluation performed to
minimize the workload of the new EA-18G crew vehicle interface design prior to flight
testing the aircraft system. The EA-18G concept was selected, from options presented in
an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) commissioned by the United States Navy, to replace
the aging EA-6B Prowler. As part of this analysis the Navy expressed concern of aircrew
workload increasing due to the reduction of aircrew in the cockpit, from four to two.
The Boeing Avionics Integration Team, in St. Louis, Missouri, developed the
design interface for the EA-18G through a series of Design Advisory Groups (DAGs)
consisting of test and fleet aircrew from the F/A-18 and EA-6B communities. As the
design of the crew vehicle interface was developed it was implemented in the Network
Centric Operations Center (NCOC) 3 simulator for evaluation by aircrew. Four workload
assessments were performed over a one year period, evaluating multiple operator tasks,
during simulated missions in various areas of the world. The crew vehicle interface
design was altered following each assessment, in order to enable the aircrew to perform
the next set of simulated missions with increased system functionality and lower operator
workload.
The design, as implemented in NCOC 3 for the fourth assessment, was not
functional enough to allow the aircrew to truly evaluate the system for a valid workload.
A fifth workload assessment was added to the program following an inconclusive
evaluation at the fourth workload assessment. The design was finalized and the simulator
was programmed to resemble the completed paper design. In addition to the finalized
design, the Human Factors Engineering team, working with the Crew Vehicle Interface
team, utilized a new method of flight testing to gather metrics, which the workload
assessments could then be compared to during the final evaluation. This new method of
Use Cases allowed the engineering team to evaluate the design based on aircrew designed
metrics for different missions and task subsets.
In the opinion of this author, although the design of the EA-18G will reduce the
number of aircrew in the cockpit, the design lends itself to a more user friendly and low
workload interface. While simulation will never replace the true reactions and workload
iv

experienced by aircrew during real combat conditions, the implementation of advanced
simulation techniques in this design has given the Navy insight into the crew vehicle
interface performance of the EA-18G system earlier in the developmental cycle than ever
before.
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PREFACE
Information contained in this thesis is unclassified and was obtained from
Department of Defense reports and manuals and product literature from Boeing St Louis.
Any conclusions or opinions presented within this document are the opinion of the author
and should not be interpreted as that of the United States Navy or the University of
Tennessee Space Institute. Approved for Public Release, 265SPR-131.05.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Designing aviation systems in the past involved building aircraft around the
general principles of aviation and physics, answering the question of “how will the
aircraft fight at high rates of acceleration and airspeed” and then providing simple
instrument gauges for the pilot. As aviation systems become more advanced with the
new technologies available today, crew vehicle interfaces on these new systems have the
potential to be overwhelming to the operator. Aircraft crew vehicle interfaces have
surpassed the older gauge and dial instruments that presented information to the aircrew.
In the current methods of design, engineers that have never used a system in combat are
designing interfaces that war fighters will be utilizing in high stress environments on a
daily basis. It has become even more important for aircrew to become involved early in
the design of these new interfaces to ensure that the requirements for an acceptable
workload environment are addressed in the design correctly.
The EA-18G program took the approach of evaluating the crew vehicle interface
design early in the program with a variety of aircrew evaluations. Through the process of
multiple aircrew advisory groups, aircrew were given the opportunity to evaluate the
design recommendations not only on paper but also as coded in the Network Centric
Operations Center (NCOC) 3 EA-18G simulation. These evaluations allowed aircrew to
address the requirements to present the information needed to perform the Electronic
Attack (EA) mission in the most appropriate and acceptable workload way for the
operator.
This paper summarizes the results of the human factors evaluation of the aircrew
workload with the EA-18G crew vehicle interface design. The issues addressed include
the comparison of crew vehicle interfaces, accurate measurement of workload analysis
and the results of the workload analysis performed using advanced simulation.
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Chapter 2: Aircraft System Background
ELECTRONIC ATTACK MISSION
The EA mission consists of denying, degrading or exploiting the enemy’s use of
the electromagnetic spectrum. This is done by intercepting, analyzing, jamming and
destroying enemy radar and communication systems. EA is accomplished with the use of
the AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming Pods, each with two transmitters, that vary in
frequency range output. In addition, the AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile
(HARM) is used to target and destroy enemy radar systems. When the aging E/F-111
aircraft was retired by the U.S. Air Force, the EA-6B became the primary EA platform
for all NATO forces. The Navy recently upgraded the EA-6B to incorporate the new
ALQ-218 receiver set on the Improved Capabilities (ICAP) III system. With this
successful program, the Navy has paved the way to a more successful integration on the
EA-18G.
EA-6B DESCRIPTION
The EA-6B (Figure 1) is a four-place, twin-engine, mid-winged monoplane
designed for carrier based operations. Grumman Aerospace Corporation based the design
of the EA-6B on the A-6 Intruder for the EA mission. The aircraft is an integrated
electronic warfare system, combining long-range all weather day and night operations
with advanced electronic countermeasures. The crew is comprised of a pilot and three
Electronic Countermeasure Officers (ECMOs). The crew is seated side-by-side in tandem
with pilot and ECMO 1 in the forward cockpit and ECMOs 2 and 3 in the aft cockpit.
This side-by-side seating arrangement in the forward cockpit was designed for maximum
comfort, visibility and crew coordination. A detailed description of the EA-6B can be
found in the EA-6B ICAP II and ICAP III NATOPS Flight Manual (Reference 1).
EA-18G DESCRIPTION
The EA-18G design is based on the integration of the ICAP III Airborne
Electronic Attack weapon system and the F/A-18F airframe systems. The F/A-18F is the
two seat model of the Super Hornet and is configured with tandem cockpits (Figure 2).
The rear cockpit can be configured with a stick, throttles, and rudder pedals (trainer
2

FIGURE 1: THREE VIEW OF THE EA-6B AIRCRAFT

Source: NATOPS Flight Manual Navy Model EA-6B Block 89A/89/82 Aircraft, NAVAIR
01-85ADC-1, dated 15 April 2004.

FIGURE 2: THREE VIEW OF THE F/A-18 SUPER HORNET

Source: NATOPS Flight Manual Navy Model F/A-18E/F Aircraft, NAVAIR A1-F18EANFM-000, dated 1 March 2001.
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configuration); or with two hand controllers, an Up Front Control Device (UFCD)
adapter, and foot-operated communication switches (missionized configuration). The
rear cockpit controls and displays operate independently (decoupled) of those in the front
cockpit. The F/A-18F Super Hornet is built by the Boeing McDonnell Douglas
Corporation based on the F/A-18 design. The F/A-18F aircraft has an internal 20 mm gun
and can carry AIM-7, AIM-9, and AIM-120 air-to-air missiles; and numerous air-toground weapons. With the addition of the ALQ-218 receiver pods on the wingtips, the
EA-18G configuration will not support the AIM-9 missile. The placement of the
Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) suite (Figure 3) of components in the gun bay location
will necessitate the removal of the 20 mm gun as well.
Current plans include retaining all air-to-ground weapon capability that the F/A18F has on the EA-18G. The aircraft fuel load may be increased with the addition of up
to five external fuel tanks. The aircraft can also be configured as an airborne tanker by
carrying a centerline mounted air refueling store. A detailed description of the F/A-18F
can be found in the F/A-18E/F NATOPS Flight Manual (Reference 2).

FIGURE 3: E/A-18G AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC ATTACK SUITE

Source: Crew Vehicle Interface Draft Cyan Book DAG #4 December 2004, Boeing
Avionics Integration Team.
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Chapter 3: System Comparison and Design
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
ICAP III has three ECMOs that divide the EA mission tasks among each position.
Each station is equipped with a single Tactical Display System (TDS) (Figure 4) and a
means of data entry. The Pilot and ECMO 1 are equipped with a hand controller (Figure
4), while ECMO 2 and 3 utilize a keypad and slew control (Figure 5). The slew control
allows the operator to position the display cursor over any signal of interest, or other
display item, and hook the signal. By hooking the signal of interest, the operator
commands amplifying information to be displayed in the frequency analysis format.
The ICAP III display formats are divided into six zones of information (Figure 6). Zone
1 is designed to display amplifying information for aircraft heading and the current

TDS
Hand
Controller

FIGURE 4: ICAP III PILOT AND ECMO CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS

Source: VX-23 ICAP III Test Team, April 2000, NAS Patuxent River.
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Digital Pointing
Device Control
Panel

TSD

FIGURE 5: ECMO 2 AND 3 DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

Source: VX-23 ICAP III Test Team, April 200, NAS Patuxent River.
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Zone 1

Zone 4

Zone 2
Zone 3

Zone 5
Zone 6

FIGURE 6: ICAP III DISPLAY ZONES

display format. Zone 2 displays frequency information on the FR/AZ format and target
information on the GEO page. Zone 3 is the primary working/display area for all
formats. It displays the frequency versus azimuth and geolocation information for the
two primary displays. Zone 4 displays weapon information for any ALQ-99 transmitter
pod and AGM-88 HARM that are loaded on the aircraft. Zone 5 displays amplifying
information on any hooked items from Zones 3 and 4. Zone 6 is the software control
stick.
The E/A-18G replaces the three ECMOs with one and the single TDS with four
individual displays; a digital UFCD, two 5” x 5” Digital Display Indicators (DDI’s) and
one 8” x 10” Digital Display (Figure 7). There are two types of display formats;
dependent and independent. A format is dependent because either the Pilot or the ECMO
control the same format at the same time. Because of this, there is a chevron and rocker
placed in the upper right hand corner of any display that the two operators can be on at
one time.
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FIGURE 7: E/A-18G AFT COCKPIT

Source: Crew Vehicle Interface Draft Cyan Book DAG #4 December 2004, Boeing
Avionics Integration Team.

If the aft cockpit has control, the display will show a rocker (an upside down
chevron), if the front cockpit has control, the format will display a chevron. Figure 8
shows that both cockpits are on the same display format at the same time (the chevron
and rocker form a diamond in the upper right hand corner).
Data entry in the EA-18G is divided among two methods, the use of the UFCD
and the Hands on Throttles and Stick (HOTAS) missionized controllers (Figure 9). The
UFCD provides the symbol and character entry method while the HOTAS provides the
primary method of slew and hook control. Hooking a signal of interest in the E/A-18G
also commands the frequency analysis format to be displayed, automatically on the left
DDI.
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FIGURE 8: OPERATOR CONTROL SYMBOL FOR DEPENDENT DISPLAY FORMATS

Source: Crew Vehicle Interface Draft Cyan Book DAG #4 December 2004, Boeing
Avionics Integration Team.

RS3

LS3
RS2

FIGURE 9: E/A-18G UFCD AND AFT COCKPIT HOTAS MISSIONIZED CONTROLLERS

Source: Crew Vehicle Interface Draft Cyan Book DAG #4 December 2004, Boeing
Avionics Integration Team.
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PRIMARY DISPLAYS
The EA mission requires two key parameters to be performed to accomplish the
mission, an indication of what frequency the threat system is operating at and a general
location of the threat. The ALQ-218 receiver set provides this information to the mission
computer to display to the operator. A single dimension display view can not be used to
display this four dimensional (frequency, three-dimensional location and time) problem
to the operator, therefore two primary displays are utilized in both designs; the Frequency
versus Azimuth (FR/AZ) and Geographical displays.
FREQUENCY VERSUS AZIMUTH (FR/AZ)
As the name describes, both designs utilize a single display to provide the
frequency versus azimuth (Figure 10) indication of the detected threat emitters to the
operator. The frequency scale is scalable to all or any portion of the detectable
electromagnetic spectrum. Even if the emitter has an actual location (latitude and
longitude), the azimuth of detection is still presented to provide a steering cue for the
jamming requirement. This cue allows the operator to assign jamming assignments and
determine that the threat emitter is covered by the ALQ-99 transmitter. The FR/AZ
format is a dependent format in the E/A-18G and independent in the ICAP III design, the
display setup is independent while the information for active emitters and jamming is
reported on all displays.
GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION
In the ICAP III design a geographic display is presented to the operator with the
threat emitter’s latitude and longitude represented by a character symbol and associated
error ellipse displaying the potential error in location (Figure 11). For the EA-18G
design the same detected signal is correlated into a grouping with other like contacts and
presented by a symbol where the group is located (Figure 11). Because there are two
TSD formats in the EA-18G design (one aft and one forward), the TSD is an independent
format. The geographic display provides the operator with threat warning information
for the striker group as well as the aircraft position. The pilot and ECMO can both view
two different displays of information on the same display format depending on the filter
and declutter settings of the operator.
10

FIGURE 10: ICAP III AND E/A-18G FREQUENCY VERSUS AZIMUTH DISPLAY FORMATS

Source: ICAP III VX-23 Test Team, NAS Patuxent River and the Crew Vehicle Interface
Draft Cyan Book DAG #4 December 2004, Boeing Avionics Integration Team.

FIGURE 11: ICAP III GEO DISPLAY AND THE E/A-18G TACTICAL SITUATION DISPLAY

Source: ICAP III VX-23 Test Team, NAS Patuxent River and the Crew Vehicle Interface
Draft Cyan Book DAG #4 December 2004, Boeing Avionics Integration Team.
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SECONDARY DISPLAYS
Secondary display formats provide the operator amplifying information about the
detected signals of interest, the weapon system status and jamming information. Each
secondary format can be viewed while still maintaining situational awareness on the
primary display of interest.
SIGNAL ANALYSIS
Upon hooking a signal of interest in either design, the operator is presented with a
signal analysis format with amplifying information of that signal. ICAP III displays this
information in the Zone 5 window of the TDS format (Figure 12). The E/A-18G displays
this information with the EPAGE on the left DDI (Figure 13). Each format was created
to display the same information to the operator in a quick intelligible manner. The
EPAGE is an independent format in the E/A-18G design.
JAMMER MANAGEMENT
ICAP III uses the Zone 5 amplifying jammer information format (Figure 14) to
display all amplifying information about a jamming assignment that have been made or
requested. The name and type of jamming assignment, frequency, coverage and ALQ-99
station where the assignment was made are all presented on these two formats. The
jammer management format (Figure 15) is a dependent format in the E/A-18G design.
By monitoring the jammer management format, the aircrew control the ALQ-99 weapon
system in order to deny and defeat the enemy radar systems. In ICAP II and III, jamming
is assigned through the use of push button actuations on a keypad, while the EA-18G
design utilizes HOTAS controls to activate jamming assignments.
STORES MANAGEMENT
The ALQ-99 transmitter pods provide the operator with information on what
jamming assignment has been made and the steering of any particular transmitter. This
information is displayed in the Zone 4 of the FR/AZ and GEO formats in ICAP III and on
the stores management format in the E/A-18G design (Figure 16). At a quick glance the
operator can determine what jammer assignments are made to each transmitter, without
12

Figure 12: ICAP III ZONE 5 EMITTER AMPLYFING INFORMATION

FIGURE 13: E/A-18G EPAGE

Source: ICAP III VX-23 Test Team, NAS Patuxent River and the Crew Vehicle Interface
Draft Cyan Book DAG #4 December 2004, Boeing Avionics Integration Team.
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Figure 14: ICAP III ZONE 3 JAS FORMAT

FIGURE 15: E/A-18G JAMMER MANAGEMENT FORMAT

Source: ICAP III VX-23 Test Team, NAS Patuxent River and the Crew Vehicle Interface
Draft Cyan Book DAG #4 December 2004, Boeing Avionics Integration Team.
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FIGURE 16: ICAP III AND E/A-18G WEAPON AND STORES MANAGEMENT FORMATS

Source: ICAP III VX-23 Test Team, NAS Patuxent River and the Crew Vehicle Interface
Draft Cyan Book DAG #4 December 2004, Boeing Avionics Integration Team.

ever viewing the jammer management format. Steering information in ICAP III is
provided by a graphical footprint on the geographic display format. In the EA-18G this
steering information is provided only by the small circle symbology on the ALQ-99
stores format. The ALQ-99 information was added to the existing F/A-18F stores
management format for commonality in stores management across the Super Hornet
fleet. The stores management format is a dependent format in the E/A-18G design.
DESIGN COMPARISON
Where the ICAP III design presents all of this information on various areas of one
or two display formats, the E/A-18G has divided the information into five different
formats on different displays. Even with the slight differences in the presentation of the
information, the E/A-18G formats were created to present the same information in a
similar and common fashion.

15

This commonality between the designs aided in leveling the skill and experience
levels of each operator (prior EA-6B operators). With this baseline in the design, the
workload analysis became a question of whether this information was presented correctly
and in a logical manner for the operator to perform the tasks required to accomplish the
EA mission.

16

Chapter 4: Analysis of Assessment Alternatives
WORKLOAD
Workload can be defined as the measurement of the demand placed upon the
operator of a system. There are two types of workload, which play a role in the tasks
performed by any operator. The first is physical workload, typically associated with the
manual labor portion of performing a task (i.e. HOTAS and push button actuations). The
operator’s skill or training generally has no impact on how well the task can be
performed. The second is mental workload, a more subjective measure of workload that
relies on the operator’s view of how hard the task was to perform. It is very difficult to
evaluate and will vary between operator and tasks. Mental workload is related to
subjective states of stress, mental effort and time pressure, leading to breakdowns in task
performance (Reference 3). A specific task does not denote a particular level of
performance or workload alone, practice, fatigue and skill level all play a role (Reference
3). While metrics are readily available for physical workload ratings (i.e. heart rate
variability and blink rate) mental workload is more difficult to determine and more
subjective.
To assess the subjective mental workload of operators, the industry has turned to a
multitude of techniques. These techniques fall into different categories, rating scale
procedures, psychometric techniques, paired comparisons and conjoint measurement and
scaling. In order to measure the workload of a system several subjective techniques are
typically used; Modified Cooper-Harper Scale, Bedford Workload Scale, Rate of
Perceived Exertion (RPE), NASA Task Load Index (TLX), Defense Research Agency
Workload Scale (DRAWS), Instant Self Assessment of Workload (ISA), and the
Subjective Workload Assessment Technique (SWAT). Rating procedures, such as
Cooper-Harper Aircraft Handling and the Bedford Workload scales, use a decision tree
process to allow the operator to rate the difficulty of the tasks. While rating scales can be
sensitive to different levels and varieties of load, psychometrics have the advantage of
being capable of providing interval information regarding task difficulty (Reference 3).
By measuring workload we can ascertain more understanding and meaning from the
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performance of a task. Typical variables in measuring workload include task completion,
time and performance quality (accuracy in performing the task) (Reference 4).
Traditionally the measurement of operator workload associated with a new system
under test does not occur until the final design has been implemented in the first test
aircraft. With software delivery schedules that bring new functionality to the aircraft
throughout it’s testing, the full design never receives a full evaluation until the very end
of the test period, typically when it is too late to change factors in the design that are
influencing high operator workload. Most of those items would then be addressed in the
next iteration of the design and not implemented for months or even years if the
individual factor was of a low priority. Multiple workload factors that combine to not
allow the operator to perform a mission area are often dealt with directly. Either way, the
impact to the program has typically been to accept a lower performance level in order to
maintain cost and schedule. By evaluating the workload of the EA-18G system early on
in the design phase, items that influenced the workload were addressed during the design
phase, before ever reaching the official flight test phase. This allowed for more
opportunity to achieve fixes to the design, enabling the chance to deliver better
performance for the fleet upon initial acceptance of the aircraft system.
MODIFIED COOPER-HARPER SCALE (MCH)
Originally designed to measure the handling qualities of aircraft under test, the
Cooper-Harper scale uses a binary decision tree to determine the workload required to fly
the aircraft. The modified scale (Figure 17) was developed to evaluate workload for
more generic situations in aircraft system testing. It can be used for perceptual, cognitive
and communication tasks (Reference 5). The scale ranges from 10 to 1, 10 being the
highest workload. Studies have been performed involving remotely piloted vehicle
systems and air defense systems to evaluate operator workload (Reference 6). The MCH
can distinguish between low and medium levels of central processing demands and
“appears to represent a globally sensitive measure as opposed to a diagnostic measure of
mental workload” (Reference 6).
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FIGURE 17: MODIFIED COOPER-HARPER RATING SCALE

BEDFORD WORKLOAD SCALE
The Bedford Workload Scale was designed to identify the operator’s spare
capacity while completing a task. The spare capacity is measured through the operator
following a hierarchical decision tree rating scale (Figure 18), while performing the task.
The scale ranges from 10 to 1 with 10 being the highest workload value. Similar to the
MCH scale, the Bedford workload scale does not have a good diagnostic capability for
determining why the subjective workload was high.
RATE OF PERCEIVED EXERTION (RPE)
RPE uses a scale from 6 to 20 (Figure 19) that was originally developed for
assessing physical workload. The verbal ratings attempt to provide a sense of subjective
evaluation to the scale. The scale evaluates the level of workload for physical activity
(i.e. exercise) by multiplying the rating of perceived exertion by 10, the scale thereby
roughly approximates the heart rate during exercise. Due to the physical nature of this
evaluation technique, it is more suited for the more physical analysis than when
attempting to assess the subjective workload of a system.
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FIGURE 18 BEDFORD WORKLOAD SCALE

FIGURE 19: PERCEIVED EXERTION SCALE

Source: Virginia Tech Army ROTC. http://www.armyrotc.vt.edu/PT/appg.pdf
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NASA TASK LOAD INDEX (TLX)
Originally developed by NASA engineers Hart and Staveland, the rating method
consists of evaluating mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance,
effort, and frustration level with a low to high rating. The scaling method is based on a 6
element structured subjective assessment, with an individual relative element calibration.
Users typically have to be trained in how to fill out the evaluation tools, which can
sometimes be difficult to interpret.
At the end of each task, the operator is asked to rate the six dimensions, based on
their descriptions and what the operator felt was emphasized more in the task (Figure 20).
After rating each element, the operator is asked to choose what element was emphasized
more through word pair association. The word pairs and the original weightings are
combined to return a workload rating for the task. The scale, while subjective, is
designed to balance out the subjectivity of an operator, thereby making it easier to
compare different subjective operator workloads for a similar task.

FIGURE 20: NASA TASK LOAD INDEX RATING SCALE DEFINITIONS (REFERENCE 7)
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DEFENSE RESEARCH AGENCY WORKLOAD SCALE (DRAWS)
DRAWS is a multi-dimensional tool (similar to NASA TLX) that provides a
subjective assessment from operators. Rating scales consist of input demand, central
demand, output demand, and time pressure. Input demand can be defined as the
“workload associated with perceiving things” (Reference 8). Central processing is the
“workload associated with interpreting information and deciding on an action”
(Reference 8). Output is “the workload associated with overt action; and Time, the
pressure to act quickly” (Reference 8). Verbal prompts are given to the operator
following each task and the operator responds with a rating (0 to 100). The workload for
each task can then be compared between operators on the 0 to 100 scale. This leaves the
operator’s skill and experience level as the determining factor in the required level of
workload for any given task evaluated.
INSTANT SELF ASSESSMENT OF WORKLOAD (ISA)
ISA is a method which allows the operator to estimate their perceived workload
during real-time simulations. At regular intervals the operator is asked to evaluate how
busy they are on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 is underutilized, 5 is excessively busy). The method
allows different operators workload to be evaluated for the same task without a particular
tool (Reference 5). This method is much more subjective in non-scripted evaluations,
due to the varying priorities between operators.
SUBJECTIVE WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES (SWAT)
Originally designed to assess aircrew workload, SWAT is a multi-dimensional
tool that incorporates factors of temporal load, mental effort and psychological stress.
There are two stages to SWAT; first, the operator ranks the level of the three workload
scales in order from the lowest to highest, through pair wise comparison (Figure 21)
before the task is performed and then rates each scale during the task. While the pair
wise comparison is similar to that used in the NASA TLX scale there are only three
factors measured in the SWAT as compared to the six in the NASA TLX scale. It has
been said that SWAT is not a very sensitive method of workload rating and therefore can
be less effective in low workload task evaluations (Reference 9).
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FIGURE 21: AN EXAMPLE OF THE PAIR-WISE COMPARISON PROCEDURE
(REFERENCE 9)
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Chapter 5: Method of Design and Analysis
DESIGN ITERATION
The design schedule for the EA-18G program was laid out in an iterative
approach, to allow the software engineers time to design, review and finally code in the
time allowed in the program, prior to delivery of the first system to flight test. Design
Advisory Groups (DAGs) were formed to review the process of the design following the
contract awarding of the program. At each DAG, the industry presented design ideas for
display formats and interface in a power point format, to aircrew from both the EA-6B
and F/A-18 communities, in order to obtain the operators perspective on the requirements
for the aircraft system interface. At the completion of each DAG the aircrew met to
discuss the changes they would like to see in the design and presented this list to the
Program Management team for approval. The changes approved were then coded into
the NCOC 3 EA-18G simulation for the next workload assessment.
The EA-18G design iteration focused on the RADAR jamming portion of EA
during the first two DAGs (DAG 1 and 2) and the AGM-88 and communications
jamming portion of EA during the last two DAGs (DAG 3 and 4). With this breakdown
in design, changes in the design requested by the aircrew following the first two DAGs
were fully funded; while allocation of funds was still plentiful. In contrast, the requests
made following the last two DAGs were approximately 70-80% funded both due to cost
and schedule impacts. In hind sight the program might have suffered functionality
needed following the later DAGs, due to these funding issues. If these issues were
addressed sooner, they could have been weighed against earlier requests as higher needs
and then implemented. To alleviate this, DAG members rated the higher workload and
mission impact items higher than other items. Even with this draw back in funding
aircrew requests, the program sought to make the changes needed for the aircrew to
perform the mission, at all costs.
WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT
As a baseline to the effort that would follow contract awarding to design a system,
that two aircrew could perform the EW mission instead of four, Boeing developed and
24

collected two separate workload surveys. The first was developed to baseline the
perceived workload of ICAP II aircrew for the SOJ support mission. Boeing, working
with the program office and the EA-6B wing at Naval Air Station (NAS) Whidbey
Island, administered the survey to 18 fleet Pilots and 21 fleet ECMOs. The second was
designed to baseline the perceived workload of the ICAP III aircrew for the SOJ support
mission. Two Pilots and four ECMOs from VX-23, who had the most experience with
ICAP III, were given the survey. The ICAP III survey was not as statistically
representative due to the ICAP III system still being very new and not yet deployed to the
fleet.
The EA-18G program had originally planned three workload assessments at
various stages throughout the design. The first assessment was at DAG 2 following
contract awarding to Boeing and Northrop Grumman. The DAG 2 assessment was based
upon a new design that had been scoped back from pre-SDD designs, due to actual design
implementation in DAG 1. The industries scoped the interface back in scale from preSDD, due to the amount of funding awarded with the contract (the crew vehicle interface
that was presented pre-contract, as the design, was not what was presented post contract).
The second and third assessments followed DAGs 3 and 4 after more of the design
iterations had a chance to be coded and implemented into the NCOC 3 EA-18G
simulator.
Due to the number of changes required following the DAG 2 and 3 reviews, to
have the design meet the requirements, there quickly became a backlog in the coding
process for the simulation. These changes were a combination of items not in the design
(aircrew inputs) and items that had been misinterpreted in the design and the coding
process. By in large, the second group composed the majority of changes to the
simulation. As a result, the workload assessment simulation following the DAG 4 review
comprised of too many errors in the simulation and did not allow the aircrew to properly
and fairly evaluate the workload during the mission profiles presented. Another
workload assessment was added to the schedule following the incorporation of the
correction of the errors noted during the DAG 4 assessment, along with the final design
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implementation. At the time of completion of this thesis, the final design assessment had
not occurred.
RATING SCALE
To evaluate the workload during these assessments, the human factors team for
the program (comprised of NAVAIR and Boeing human factors engineers) utilized a
combination of the NASA Task Load Index (TLX) rating and a Modified Bedford
Cooper-Harper Rating Scale. The NASA TLX rating was determined to “be more
sensitive to changes in workload” (Reference 4) while providing a highly reliable rating
for tasks performed by the operator. The NASA TLX was thought to provide direction in
pinpointing opportunities for implementing design changes and automation requirements
of the EA-18G. The modified Bedford Cooper-Harper Scale was applied to each
questionnaire to bound and describe what constituted a workload rating level (Figure 22).
Each assessment was setup so that the aircrew performing in the simulator had no prior
knowledge of the real scenario or specific workload tasks involved. The aircrew teams
were provided a mission briefing a day before their individual simulation to allow for any
pre-simulator planning required. The scenarios used for workload assessments following
DAG 2 and DAG 3 were the same, using similar tasks and systems, while incorporating
the improved design features and functionality at each new assessment. In order to assess
the impact of pre-knowledge of the scenario for the aircrew in the last assessment in
DAG 4, the scenario was altered and split into two sections. In each workload
assessment the aircrew were given a specific mission to perform; such as stand off
jamming, close air support, or escort strike, and abort criteria for each mission; such as a
specific emitter being detected or a popup air threat. Each scenario covered a different
mission area of EW that the simulator could perform with the given design at that time
period. As each workload assessment was completed, the design functionality increased
resulting in more of the systems being incorporated for the operator to manage in the
mission scenario.
In general the aircrew did not waste valuable response time writing down their
observations or frustrations during the assessment. A digital recording of all audio and
display video of operator actions for each crew station was recorded for post-simulator
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impacting existing tasks.
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accept additional tasks
without impacting existing
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with minimum impact to
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degrade existing tasks.
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8
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9
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and task sharing breakdown,
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Figure 22: MODIFIED BEDFORD COOPER HARPER RATING SCALE

Source: Pre-SDD Phase 2 Final Program Management Review – HFE Workload
Assessment, Seavers and Perkins, Boeing Avionics Integration Team, St Louis MO
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play back. While the aircrew performed their mission, the human factors team recorded
comments and actions of the aircrew throughout the simulation. The mission time line
for each scenario involved triggers for workload tasks that the human factors team
wanted to see performed. They consisted of both pre-briefed tasks that went as expected
and involved novel or unexpected failures. During the post-simulator debrief the crew
was provided a NASA TLX questionnaire (see Appendix C for a sample question) and
asked to fill it out. The aircrew would first describe their performance criteria for the
given task and then circle words on the NASA TLX pair-wise comparison table that they
felt influenced the workload the most. Definitions of each pair-wise word were provided
on the same sheet for reference. Then the aircrew were asked to rate the magnitude of
each workload factor using the Modified Bedford Cooper-Harper scale for each TLX. If
there were any ratings greater than 3 provided in the aircrew comments, they were asked
to elaborate on what may have been the cause of such a rating.
In order to jolt the memory of actions performed and frustrations observed during
the simulation, the crew was provided the capability to view the digital playback
recording; with audio and video synchronized to each other. Groups were not allowed to
interact with each other until after the assessment for that mission task level was
completed, hoping to not sway comments from any one group. In addition, the workload
levels for one team were not known by another until briefed months later. As the crew
filled out their individual questionnaire, they also noted any discrepancies in the
simulation that were not as designed and that may have impacted the workload
assessment. These design inconsistencies were taken into account by the human factors
team during their analysis.
During the process of filling out the questionnaires, the aircrew were asked to
base their answers on whether they had accomplished their task acceptably or not.
Because the aircrew where not aware of the actual task being assessed prior to seeing the
questionnaire, there was some subjective interpretation of what was good enough for a
given task. After the DAG 3 workload assessment it became clear that the tasks being
performed were complex and more subject to interpretation. A workload level for a task
does not provide useful information if you can not determine if the task was actually
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accomplished and within a prescribed metric. Because of this, a set of metrics were taken
from the Use Cases being developed by the aircrew for flight testing. The human factors
team grouped several Use Cases together, in a logical mission order, and determined
which ones the NCOC 3 simulator could record during an assessment. This provided the
capability to compare each operator’s metric accomplishment to each other. For
example, if the task was to perform an AGM-88 HARM missile shot on a newly active
emitter, the time it took to complete that task and whether the shot was taken or not are
the important factors. If the first operator, who took 15 seconds to perform the task, rated
the task a 6 on the NASA TLX scale and another operator called it a 3, and took 25
seconds, the human factors team could better analyze whether the second operator’s
rating was lower because they took more time to complete the task or because they had
more experience with the design. If both operators took reasonably the same amount of
time, then the difference was most likely based on the experience level of the operators.
To help alleviate this factor, a wide source of aircrew were utilized in the assessments.
COMPILING OF QUESTIONAIRE VALUES
After the aircrew provided their comments and ratings on the questionnaires, the
human factors team compiled the rating numbers and applied the appropriate weighting
factors for each aircrew and TLX (Figure 23). The raw rating was taken directly from the
Modified Bedford Cooper-Harper rating scale values used to rate what influenced each
TLX. The weight factor for each scale title was calculated from the pair-wise words
circled and a total value was found by summing each individual values. Those scale titles
that returned higher weighting values were circled more often in the comparison. Once
both of these values were calculated, they were multiplied together to return an adjusted
rating. The adjusted ratings were then summed and divided by the total weighting value
to return the specific aircrew workload for the given TLX. That data from all the
worksheets were compiled and plotted in graphical format for reporting purposes.
AIRCREW SELECTION AND PAIRING
Aircrew selection for the workload assessments was crucial to obtain a large
sample source of operators. Aircrew from VX Developmental Test (DT) squadrons, VX
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Scale Title

Weight

Raw Rating

Adjusted Rating (WtxRaw)

Mental Demand
Physical Demand
Temporal Demand
Effort
Performance
Frustration

4
0
4
2
4
1

4
1
6
3
5
5

16.00
0.00
24.00
6.00
20.00
5.00

Total

15

Range 1-10

composite
4.73
TLX 3-level 1
ECMO 1
Figure 23: EXAMPLE OF COMPILED DATA FROM AIRCREW WORKSHEET

Operational Test (OT) squadrons, fleet replacement squadrons, fleet weapon schools,
F/A-18 Pilots, F/A-18 Weapon System Operator’s (WSO), EA-6B Pilot’s and EA-6B
ECMOs were all chosen to compile this sample set (Table 1). Those aircrew from DT
squadrons had the most experience with testing new system designs and had a baseline
working level knowledge of how the workload assessment process should work. The
remainder of the sample set had only the knowledge gained from the design presentations
in the DAGs and the training provided the day or two prior to each assessment. This
limited knowledge was a concern to program leadership and training took a high priority
prior to each assessment. Prior to each assessment there were two days of simulator
training provided, to allow the aircrew time to assimilate the new design changes and
help rule out training as a factor influencing the workload assessment. The Pilot and
ECMO combination of each crew was organized by an experienced DT aircrew that was
designated by the program office. Each crew was grouped together based on prior flight
experience and time in type model. Crews that could be composed of operators from the
same squadron were utilized first, to help negate any aircrew coordination factors that
might impact the workload levels.
Another issue for the workload assessments was in maintaining the same
operators for each assessment. Due to the turn over in military assignments for aircrew
and the lengthy time between the first DAG 2 assessment and the DAG 4 assessment, a
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Table 1: AIRCREW PARTICIPATION AND EXPERIENCE

Aircrew
Pilot 1
Pilot 1a
Pilot 2
Pilot 2a
Pilot 3
Pilot 3a
Pilot 4
Pilot 4a
Pilot 5
Pilot
ECMO 1
ECMO 1a
ECMO 2
ECMO 2a
ECMO 3
ECMO 4
ECMO 4a
ECMO 5
ECMO 5a
ECMO 6

Aircraft
Experience
EA-6B
F/A-18A-F
EA-6B
F/A-18A-F
EA-6B
F/A-18A-F
EA-6B
F/A-18A-F
EA-6B
F/A-18A-F
EA-6B
F/A-18A-F
F/A-18A-F
EA-6B
EA-6B
F/A-18A-F
F/A-18A-F
EA-6B
F/A-18A-F
EA-6B
F/A-18A-F
EA-6B
F/A-18A-F
EA-6B
F/A-18A-F
EA-6B
F/A-18A-F
F/A-18A-F
EA-6B
F/A-18A-F
EA-6B
F/A-18A-F
EA-6B
F/A-18A-F
EA-6B
F/A-18A-F

Squadron
Hours
1000
200
1350
100
975
50
1430
60
1560
150
1300
140
1500
2050
1800
200
1300
No
Data
930
260
2200
400
900
100
1100
75
1500
800
2
2300
50
800
15
No
Data

NSAWC

Workload
Participation
DAG 2, 3

VX-23

DAG 3

VAQ-129

DAG 2

VX-23

DAG 3, 4

VX-9

DAG 2

VX-9

DAG 3, 4

VX-31
VX-31
VX-31

DAG 2
DAG 3
DAG 2, 3, 4

VX-23
NSAWC

DAG 4
DAG 2

VFA-122

DAG 3, 4

CVWP

DAG 2

VX-23

DAG 3, 4

VX-9

DAG 2, 3, 4

VX-31
EAWS

DAG 2
DAG 3

VX-30

DAG 2

VX-30

DAG 3, 4

VX-31

DAG 4
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large number of operators left and were replaced. In order to maintain some data that
could be compared throughout the four assessments the team tried to maintain a small
number of crews that had participated in all the DAGs. TABLE 1 shows as list of
aircrew that participated in the workload assessments and their flight time in type model.
A mix of fleet experienced F/A-18 and EA-6B aircrew was requested for each workload
but not always achieved. Anyone with more than 500 hours in type is assumed to be fleet
experienced.
TASK MANAGEMENT
Iani and Wickens (Reference 10) describe several factors that affect aircrew task
management in aviation. These are described as task complexity, cognitive or attentional
tunneling, task importance, and physical salient (Reference 10). As the workload
assessments continued throughout the design process, the task complexity in the
simulator increased. New functionality was added and higher level tasks could be
evaluated by the human factors team. Each workload assessment was performed during a
two day period. The first day the crew would be asked to perform the mission at one task
complexity level and the next day the same scenario with different, higher level tasks,
would be performed. The first day’s assessment would be fairly simple in order to
provide a baseline for the new design functionality. The final CVE 1 is planned to be a
four hour extended mission during one day, with increasing task workloads.
By not briefing the aircrew on all of the tasks to be evaluated during the mission,
the human factors team attempted to reduce the cognitive tunneling that can occur during
the performance of a task. Iani and Wickens describe cognitive tunneling as “the
compellingness, and not necessarily the complexity, of the task at hand may decrease the
awareness that other tasks need to be performed in general, and decrease our ability to
notice cues signaling the need to switch to another task” (Reference 10). Aircrew, who
had experience in EW, were left to their own decision process to prioritize what tasks
needed to be performed (task importance), rather than try to meet the objectives of the
workload assessment. This allowed the human factors team to separate any undue
induced pressure of task completion from the assessment.
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To simulate as real of an experience as possible during the workload assessments,
the human factors team used prior aircrew on the Boeing simulator team, to provide
scripted radio calls during the event. This, plus the added benefit of a dome simulator
that could project a realistic simulation of flight, and a scripted scenario aided in
producing controlled physical salient. During certain assessments, a negative salient was
introduced when the simulator system crashed. The crew would be through half of the
mission and because of the design of the scripted mission it would have to be restarted.
This occasionally introduced a certain amount of bias due to the aircrew knowing what to
expect during the second run at the scenario. Any trigger that had been unexpected
previously was adapted to and was overcome more easily. Recommendations were made
to script future scenarios in a way that they could be restarted at any point if the simulator
crashed.
SCENARIO TASK DEFINITION
The human factors team developed a set of critical mission tasks for evaluation
(Appendix E) through out the design phase. The scenario for each workload assessment
was then defined as the series of these tasks and events that were required to complete
that specific mission. The mission scenarios were derived by EW subject matter experts
and approved by the program manager. Pre-SDD paper surveys of the ICAP III and II
systems were based on the standoff support mission. DAG 2 and 3 focused on the Standoff Jamming mission and the system capability to manage detected threats. DAG 4
focused on the Modified Escort and Close Air Support scenarios. These mission areas
were derived from the standard areas that EA-6B aircrew train in the fleet to help
alleviate and issues of the aircrew not having experience in a particular mission area.
As part of each of these different mission scenarios, a set of NASA TLX tasks
were comprised for a specific time interval during the mission. The operator was
required to key into the additional tasks in this set while still performing the base tasks
required for completion of the mission. Tables B1 through B6 show these individual
tasks for each workload assessment. The workload assessments were run at multiple
levels of difficulty. The first assessment of a crew for the particular mission was at an
induced lower level of workload and then raised for the next level. Therefore the higher
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level number represents the attempt to induce a higher workload. The human factors
team increased the level of workload by inducing faults and failures into the system that
the operator had to work around to perform the task set. They also applied external
environmental cues to the operator to create a perceived urgency while performing a
specific task. These injected faults and cues also provided the team with the ability to
evaluate whether the cue was sufficient to notify the operator when a issue of importance
was present.
USE CASE METRICS
Use Cases have been present for a number of years in the software development
field. The EA-18G program set out to develop Use Cases as a means to better combine
the efforts of the developmental and operational test squadrons during flight test.
Tactical Use Case’s were written to provide a more mission relatable method of testing to
developmental test planning and execution, while still addressing the specifications
required for the aircraft system. While developing the set of Use Cases the flight test
team will utilize in later test, a set of metrics were developed for each Use Case to
provide data and relevance to the test. In the development of these metrics it became
obvious, as it had in the workload evaluation, that workload estimates of actions
performed by the operator without an end result of how to determine the action was
completed successfully, would leave open questions of whether the workload rating was
valid or not.
Each Use Case was developed to be a set of actions that an operator would have
to perform for a task, given a specific vignette, in a mission area. Vignettes were defined
as a set of specific operational conditions sufficient and necessary to support an
appropriate level of analysis or assessment and, typically, a segment of a mission phase.
The mission areas that the vignettes consisted of were taken from the common set of
areas to which the EA-6B aircrew train and fight. The particular actions were written in a
general form that did not specifically lay out how to perform the task just that the task
had to be performed (Figure C1). An example of this, is do not tell the operator to press
push button 5 to activate the audio capability of the receiver set, instead it was stated
“Evaluate Scan Rate and Scan Type using AUDIO function as required”. This allowed
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for a better evaluation of the functionality and less of the software logic used to perform
the function.
While some metrics (Figure C2) put in place for the Use Case’s came directly
from the specifications provided for the program, a large portion of the specific tasks
were not covered. The Use Case team developed additional metrics based on input from
fleet experienced aircrew who knew the specific mission areas. These metrics, while not
binding to the contractor, enabled the test team to use a mission relatable set of metrics
for testing. Because the Use Case team was developing the Use Cases in parallel with the
workload assessments, the Use Cases were not utilized until the final workload
assessment, slated for September 2005.
The human factors team chose sets of the Tactical Use Cases that would relate to
the full length mission during the final workload assessment and grouped them together
to create a timeline of tasks. They determined how to utilize the functionality of the
NCOC 3 simulation hardware and observation tools to capture the various metrics. Some
metrics were determined to be flight test only, while others could be captured using
various different methods, while some only with the use of the NASA TLX scale.
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Chapter 6: Results
ICAP II SURVEY RESULTS
The workload assessment survey for the ICAP II system returned results showing
that the highest workload was for the ECMO performing front seat tasks (Figure 24).
When this result is taken in context of what tasks the front seat ECMO performs,
situational awareness becomes the largest impact to workload. With no front seat display
to provide the ECMO 1 information on what is going on in the mission at any on time.
They have to rely on feedback from the backseat. Temporal and performance were the
two largest influences to the aircrew tasks assessed in the survey.
The pilot’s workload increased for the descent to HARM launch because of the
mental and temporal demand increase in flying the aircraft to the designated launch point.
The recovery TLX also increased due to the physical and performance increase of
landing a jet aircraft on the pitching deck of a carrier. The survey provided results as best
recalled by the operators involved with no simulation of events. Because of this, there is
some bias to be accounted for from the memory of the operator. The tolerance could be
as much as ± 1.0 difference in the resultant workload rating. Overall, the workload
survey did provide a baseline workload for the program that was within 1.0 of the minor
compensation level.
ICAP III SURVEY RESULTS
The ICAP III survey was given to DT and TO aircrew prior to the programs
operational evaluation. During this time the design implementation was riddled with
system performance issues. This was listed as a causal factor in the higher workload
ratings for the survey (Figure 25). In particular, the Geolocation issues, the program was
suffering at the time, making reactive jamming difficult to manage, causing the TLX
rating to be very high. The aircrew rated temporal and frustration as the two highest
influences to completing the reactive jamming task successfully. Because both the ICAP
II and III designs utilize four aircrew to perform the EW mission, the difference in
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Figure 24: ICAP II WORKLOAD SURVEY RESULTS
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Figure 25: ICAP III WORKLOAD SURVEY RESULTS
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Pilot
ECMO 1
ECMO 2 (3)

workload rating can be attributed to operator training in workload evaluations. Fleet
operators, those questioned in the ICAP II survey, are accustomed to compensate for
difficult tasks and therefore do not see tasks as being difficult, they are used to dealing
with the issue of poorly designed systems. DT and TO test aircrew are trained to
evaluate while ignoring compensation. If the task is difficult they will rate it as such and
suggest changes to lower the workload. Aside from the issues of reactive jamming, the
other TLX ratings were still within only a 1.0 difference in the workload rating. The
ICAP III survey provided a baseline workload rating for the EA-18G design in which to
be compared.
DAG 2 LEVEL 1
The DAG 2 workload assessment was the first look at the workload for the DAG
1 design iteration in NCOC 3. The design was fairly simple involving some signal
analysis and jamming tasks. The level 1 assessment (Figure 26) concentrated on the
jamming tasks with minor system failures. The result was an overall workload
assessment of 4.0 or less. Some improvements were noted in the design that would
reduce the workload rating for all the areas of concern, but especially status monitoring
and jamming. Each crew of operators were told to divide the tasks among themselves for
the given mission. During the level 1 assessment, the pilots shared in the jamming tasks
by trying to jam from the front display set. This was determined to be not as easy to
perform as from the backseat because it caused the pilot to be more heads down than
normal to fly the aircraft. As a result, the pilot and ECMO workload rating for the
jamming tasks ended up being about the same. Overall, the jamming tasks were a
slightly higher workload rating than the baseline ICAP II survey presented.
DAG 2 LEVEL 2
During the level 2 assessment (Figure 27), the scenario was designed to include
and evaluate the impact of failures on the design. Because of the issues the pilots had
during the level 1 assessment they ended up shedding some of the jamming tasks to the
ECMO. This, combined with the design issues of noticing and then dealing with the
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FIGURE 26: DAG 2 AVERAGE LEVEL 1 TLX

Source: EA-18G Human Engineering Crew Vehicle Interface Analysis Report – Aircrew
(CVIAR-A), Revision D, 22 June 2005

FIGURE 27: DAG 2 AVERAGE LEVEL 2 TLX

Source: EA-18G Human Engineering Crew Vehicle Interface Analysis Report – Aircrew
(CVIAR-A), Revision D, 22 June 2005
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induced system failures, increased the workload rating for the ECMO. At the same time,
the pilot workload rating decreased due to the shed tasks to the ECMO. The overall
margin of the highest workload rating to the level of significant compensation was
decreased. Mental, temporal and performance ratings influenced the overall workload
ratings more than any other from the level 1 assessment to the level 2 assessment.
DAG 3 LEVEL 1
The DAG 3 scenario was focused around the SOJ mission. Due to the time
between the DAG 2 and 3 events a small turnover in aircrew performing the workload
assessments occurred. Because of this, there were aircrew that had never seen the design
before arriving to the assessment so a short training period prior to the workload
assessment was provided for all aircrew involved. Aircrews were asked to divide up the
tasks needed to perform the mission, so that no one individual was performing the entire
mission. This division of labor in aircrew task management can be seen in the preemptive HARM shot and jamming tasks. The pilot’s workload for the pre-emptive
HARM shot was higher than the ECMO due to having to maneuver the aircraft on a time
line, in order to make the shot. The jamming tasks were higher for the ECMO than the
pilot, as well as the reactive HARM shot; as a result of the ECMO utilizing the HARM
reactive launch procedure on the aft seat HOTAS.
Level 1 (Figure 28) did not include failures and the situational air picture was well
presented to the operators at all times. Even with the added functionality of HARM and
some CCS added for this assessment, the overall highest workload rating was not any
higher than the DAG 2 level 1 results.
DAG 3 LEVEL 2
Level 2 (Figure 29) injected failures into the scenario with the intent of increasing
the workload. The end result of the assessment showed a decrease in workload overall.
The division of task sharing can still be seen in the results, including the pilots taking
more of a role in the reactive HARM. Most crews gave all or most HARM tasks to the
pilot while the ECMO took all responsibility for jamming. The decrease in workload
rating overall appeared to be a result of training. By this workload assessment, the crews
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Figure 28: DAG 3 AVERAGE LEVEL 1 TLX

Source: EA-18G Human Engineering Crew Vehicle Interface Analysis Report – Aircrew
(CVIAR-A), Revision D, 22 June 2005

Figure 29: DAG 3 AVERAGE LEVEL 2 TLX

Source: EA-18G Human Engineering Crew Vehicle Interface Analysis Report – Aircrew
(CVIAR-A), Revision D, 22 June 2005
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had been provided four hours of training and the two hour workload assessment level 1.
The fear was that as the operators became more familiar with both the design and the
scenario tasks that the workload rating decreased. As a result, more training was
provided to the crews prior to the DAG 4 workload assessment. A different scenario was
utilized for the level 2 vice level 1 assessment to help reduce the impacts of prior
knowledge of the scenario influencing the workload rating.
DAG 4 LEVEL 1 AND 2
By DAG 4, the human factors team had made several changes in the process of
workload assessment. The first was to use two different scenarios for the two levels of
assessment (Figure 30 and Figure 31). This helped to reduce the familiarity with the
scenario and any impact to the workload assessment. The second was to provide more
training to the aircrew. More training was implemented to reduce the impacts of the
operator not being familiar with the design on the workload rating. The design was to be
in the final IOC configuration by this workload assessment; however a number of display
formats and functionality had not been implemented in NCOC 3. Because of this, the
workload assessment was ruled inconclusive by the program office.
However, the assessment did provide suggestions for the design to help the
workload ratings decrease in the long run. It also gave a glimpse at the workload rating
for a different mission area, the modified escort jamming support and the Close Air
Support (CAS) jamming missions. CAS jamming is renowned as being the most difficult
mission area the EA-6B aircrews have to perform with the current ICAP systems. It also
showed that frustration and performance were the highest factors that influenced the
overall workload, which was assessed as being a result of the incomplete simulator
implementation of the design that did not allow the aircrew to fulfill the mission. The
level 2 numbers showed the expected slight increase in workload rating due to the added
failures introduced into the scenario.
AVERAGE WORKLOAD FOR JAMMING
When the data reported for those tasks that required jamming is compared, the
results showed a positive trend of decreasing workload ratings (Figure 32) over the four
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Figure 30: DAG 4 AVERAGE LEVEL 1 TLX

Source: EA-18G Human Engineering Crew Vehicle Interface Analysis Report – Aircrew
(CVIAR-A), Revision D, 22 June 2005

Figure 31: DAG 4 AVERAGE LEVEL 2 TLX

Source: EA-18G Human Engineering Crew Vehicle Interface Analysis Report – Aircrew
(CVIAR-A), Revision D, 22 June 2005
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EA-18G Average Workload for Jamming Tasks Over All Assessments
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Figure 32: AVERAGE WORKLOAD RATINGS FOR JAMMING TASKS

DAG evaluations. The overall workload rating to perform a mission has decreased over
time; however the workload rating still exceeds the goal of minor compensation level.
Even though the specific tasks for each scenario were not always the same, the
comparison of the overall mission workload demonstrated the benefits of improvements
made from each previous DAG in helping to reduce the overall workload. Figure 32
illustrates a fairly flat pilot workload rating throughout the three DAGs. This helps to
demonstrate the successful characteristics of the pilot vehicle interface of the F/A-18
design. The ECMO workload started higher than anticipated and then decreased
significantly with the implementation of design changes that effected workload.
ANALYSIS OF ECMO WORKLOAD
Figure 33 and Figure 34 illustrate the composite workload for the ECMO in the
EA-18G design for the three assessments, at both difficulty levels. The level 1 results
show that the workload for the DAG 2 design was higher than the minor compensation
level desired. As the DAG 3 design was assessed, it incorporated suggested changes to
the DAG 2 design that were implemented to lower the operator workload. The DAG 3
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Figure 33: WORKLOAD RATINGS FOR ECMO LEVEL 1 ASSESSMENTS
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Figure 34: WORKLOAD RATINGS FOR ECMO LEVEL 2 ASSESSMENTS
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level 1 results for workload were unfortunately higher as a result of the newly added, and
never seen, design functionality. Even with the inconclusive results obtained during
DAG 4, the average workload for the DAG 4 design was lower than that of the DAG 3
design. This is an indication that the design change recommendations made during the
DAG 3 assessment helped to reduce the workload for the new design additions.
The level 2 results indicate a similar trend. The design change recommendations
that were made following DAG 2, significantly reduced the workload required to perform
the similar tasks in the DAG 3 assessment. Unlike the level 1 results, the level 2 results
do show a negative trend with increasing workload ratings with the DAG 4 results. It
was determined that this increase in workload rating was a direct result of the operator
being influenced by the simulation issues that were present in the DAG 4
implementation. There was an increase in both the mental and frustration levels required
to perform the tasks successfully and to attend to the failures induced in the simulation.
ANALYSIS OF PILOT WORKLOAD
Figure 35 and Figure 36 illustrate the composite workload for the pilot in the EA-18G
design for the three assessments, at both difficulty levels. The level 1 workload values
were higher than the level 2 values reported. It was determined that as a result of the
pilot taking on more responsibility for the more unfamiliar complex tasks, their workload
ratings increased. The pilots in the EA-6B community, while knowing the mission, do
not perform the more complex tasks of electronic surveillance or jamming. Because of
this, when the pilots took on the new unfamiliar tasks, there was a learning curve that
took place at each assessment. By the time the level 2 assessment occurred, the pilots
were familiar enough with the new task that the workload results reflected the actual
design implementation.
The DAG 4 results for the pilots were no higher than those of the DAG 3 results. Even
with the inconclusive assessment due to simulator issues, a positive trend can be assumed
with the pilot results. Design inputs and changes implemented to help reduce the
workload throughout the design iteration did help maintain the workload at or near the
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Figure 35: WORKLOAD RATINGS FOR PILOT LEVEL 1 ASSESSMENTS

Figure 36: WORKLOAD RATINGS FOR PILOT LEVEL 2 ASSESSMENTS
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previous assessment, even though new design functionality and increased task loading
was occurring at each assessment. The pilot workload ratings for all tasks at the level 2
difficulty, while not below, are very close to the desired minor compensation required for
system workload.
COMMON TASKS
When the human factors team developed the scenarios for the workload
assessments they designed the scenarios around similar tasks for the various missions.
This was an attempt to allow a comparison of results throughout the multiple
assessments. Figure 37 illustrates the common tasks that were assessed with the
composite workload values for all pilots and ECMOs for each task during the three DAG
assessments. The higher values for the receive CAS message task were determined to be
a result of the many simulator issues during DAG 4. The other tasks, while not all below
the minor compensation level desired, were all below the significant compensation
required. The pilot workload rating tends to be lower than the minor compensation
required and can be a result of the integration of the pilot into a mission unlike they have
been in the past with the EA-6B. The tasks the ECMOs performed were more of the
complex EW tasks than those the pilot performed. The comparisons of these same tasks
with the results for similar tasks from the ICAP II and III surveys (Figure 38)
demonstrate a positive trend in not only equaling but also reducing the workload required
to perform the task. The ICAP II and III surveys were not all inclusive and there were
tasks that were never evaluated. For those tasks that were evaluated in the survey, the
results from the DAG assessments demonstrate that the workload required for the EA18G design was lower than that of the EA-6B.

48

Figure 37: COMPOSITE WORKLOAD FOR COMMON TASKS

Figure 38: COMPARISON OF COMPOSITE WORKLOAD RATINGS BY SPECIFIC TLX
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations
CONCLUSIONS
The implementation of the advanced cockpit simulation in the early stages of the
EA-18G design provided a multitude of benefits to the program. It allowed the human
factors team to identify the higher risk areas of workload in the design much earlier and
provided focus for the workload assessments to answer the question of whether the two
aircrew system can perform the mission. With this knowledge, the design was able to
continually be corrected to ensure the workload levels did not increase, or if they did, that
methods were introduced to reduce the workload during the next assessment. Even
though the final successful workload assessment has not been completed, the design of
the EA-18G system is at a much lower workload level than when it started and should
provide the operators a very efficient means of completing the Electronic Warfare
mission.
Crew coordination issues were discovered early on through the use of the NCOC
3 simulation. With the help of the workload assessments, the analysis of the results has
allowed program management to realize the necessity of pilot integration into the
Electronic Warfare mission. The typical training track for pilots in the EA-6B
community trains the pilots in EW, but does it at a lesser quantity and quality than that of
the ECMO, due to the limited interaction the pilot actually has with the weapon system in
the ICAP II and III. With the design and implementation of the EA-18G, it has been
proven that the pilot is going to be just as important as the ECMO in completing the EA
mission. This has had impacts on the training process and timeline of a pilot for this new
platform and community.
The advanced simulation helped recognize those areas overlooked from
implementation and integration of the ICAP III system into the EA-18G and the areas
where the implementation of the new design features had been incorrect. If the program
had relied on paper-only planning to provide sufficient coverage of the design, it is quite
possible that the engineering interpretation of the requests and needs of the operators
would have led to failure to produce a viable system for the end user. The use of the
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simulation helped to discover software coding issues very early in the design. It also
allowed for training to be provided to the new industry partner, Boeing, in the world of
Electronic Warfare. Without this training, the industry team misconceptions of how the
systems should perform would have propagated into the test and evaluation of the system,
potentially leading to disputes between the program management of all concerned.
The advanced simulation provided a means to train the new members on the
government team as well. The balancing of multiple major programs concurrently (the
ICAP III test program completing while the EA-18G program began) made it difficult to
bring all of the flight test team on board for the early design of the system. A select few
led the way and helped interpret the requirements for the industry, while the remainder of
the team came onboard later. With the advanced simulation already laid out in NCOC 3,
training the new engineering support personnel on what to expect from the design when it
reaches flight test, became easier than just simply relying on their interpretation of the
written word. This was extremely important for those who had not been a part of the
ICAP III test team.
After convening multiple DAGs to refine the simulation to provide the correct
presentation of the government’s expectations, the simulation provided a baseline for the
lab testing of software for the aircraft. The software coders were able to begin
programming the real mission computer software while relying on the NCOC 3
simulation as a tool in helping to define their interpretation of the design. While the
simulation will never completely capture the true characterization of the systems, it did
provide a valid picture of the integration that was required to occur for all the systems to
work together successfully.
The advanced simulation of the design has allowed the test community another
asset in the development of testing procedures and ideas, such as Use Cases. Use Cases
allowed the human factors team to “identify mission areas that were significant with
respect to aircrew workload levels” (Reference 10) and develop new means to identify
ways of reducing the workload in those areas. It provided a means to validate the newly
implemented Use Case process for flight test and provide a means for engineers to
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validate their requirements and procedures for ground and flight testing. As each new
test procedure is developed, the simulation of the design in NCOC 3 can be used to
validate the procedure without waiting for an actual aircraft. This will help to ensure that
the procedures are sound and take less time away for verification of those procedures,
during the already short flight test program.
The ability to view the limitations and characteristics of the crew vehicle interface
early on in the design, coupled with the existing knowledge of the characteristics of those
systems already on the ICAP III and F/A-18F aircraft, allowed the program to develop a
baseline for tactics that are not typically started until much later in the program. In other
programs, the development of tactics occurs after an extensive and lengthy Operational
Evaluation (OPEVAL) period. With the capability to start this process earlier, with the
help of the advanced simulation, the program hopes to simply verify the developed tactics
during a shorter OPEVAL period. This will allow the program to take less time and
money away from crucial flight test on the integration of the systems.
While the simulation of the design provided these benefits, it did not provide a
look at the true characterization of the system to be tested and has potentially skewed the
mental picture that the program members have of the systems expected performance; the
largest area of misperception resulting from the display of threats on the TSD. In the
simulation, the threat environment is just that, a simulation. The picture that is displayed
to the operator does not contain any flaws or imperfections that are anticipated with the
actual system performance and integration of an EW weapon system into an aircraft.
Some of the testers and engineers on the program have no concept of this perception,
leading to the potential of the design not being fully capable or robust enough to handle
the true characterization of the system. A certain amount of this is to be expected,
considering simulation of the real world electromagnetic spectrum is a very difficult, if
not impossible, task to accomplish.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the results seen from using the NCOC 3 simulation to identify and
reduce the aircrew workload on the EA-18G design, the author recommends that further
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development of the design be performed with the use of the same simulation efforts. The
NCOC 3 simulation can continue to be used to support the development of tactics and
training, at much less cost than operating flight test aircraft. Future NAVAIR system
integration programs should view advanced simulation techniques as a successful means
of integrating software design requirements with operator expectations.
The author recommends continuing to involve operators in the early design
iterations of new systems and software. Early and iterative involvement of operator input
into the design of aviation systems can provide valuable information to the engineering
team for the design. The process of DAGs and simulation events for operator evaluations
can help not only train the engineering team in the mission and the requirements, but also
help to realize any potential design implementation issues. Design iterations performed
on power point are subject to individual interpretation, while simulation of the actual
software presents the true characterization of the design.
Using simulation for early human factors evaluations for new design integration
can help reduce the amount of higher priced flight test required. While it will never
completely eliminate the need for flight testing the interface in the real world
environment, especially when interacting with the electromagnetic spectrum, it can
provide a much earlier look at the flaws and issues created by higher workload tasks
within in the system.
A process of selecting the correct aircrew to evaluate the human factors
implications (workload) of a new design is crucial. The military spends millions of
dollars training aircrew in a particular specialty that should be utilized to the fullest
potential. While all Test Pilot School graduates are taught to be as diverse in evaluating
designs as possible, nothing can take the place of experience. The selection of future
aircrew to perform simulation evaluations should be placed around a diverse approach.
The compliment of evaluators should be comprised of test oriented personnel with a
specialty in the field of use for the new system (i.e., distinguish between EW and air-toair warfare) and personnel that have the tactical experience required in the system area,
who may not have any test experience.
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Integration of new and potentially combined rating scales that pertain more
directly to the needs of the program can add focus and concentrate the efforts of the
evaluators. The overall cookbook process that has been laid out in methods such as
Cooper-Harper and the Bedford scales can act as the road map to follow, while changing
the particulars to fit the requirements of the programs efforts. Test teams should never
assume that one rating scale fits all needs for evaluation.
It is recommended by the author that these methods continue to be used to help
lower the risks to future programs. The lessons learned during the simulation efforts to
evaluate the task workload in the EA-18G design should be passed onto other NAVAIR
programs to aid in risk reduction for all programs.
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FIGURE A-1 NASA TLX RATING SCALE DEFINITIONS
REFERENCE: TLX-USER MANUAL
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FIGURE A-2 NASA TLX RATING SCALES
REFERENCE: TLX-USER MANUAL
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TABLE B-1: DAG 2 STANDOFF JAMMING WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT TASKS
(REFERENCE 10)
Workload
Assessment

Task
Level

TLX
1

2

3
DAG 2

1

4
5
6
7
8

Task Set

Introduced
Failures
None

System start-up,
Initialization, BIT
Establish Situational None
Awareness (task
that would typically
be performed
during Take-off,
Departure, Climbout,) System
Monitor, COMM,
Pre-Push, Join-up,
None
Climb, Ingress,
System Monitor,
Pre Vulnerable
JAMMING Task
Pre-Vulnerable, Pre- None
Emptive
JAMMING
Pre-Vulnerable, Pre- None
Emptive JAMMING
None
Pre- Vulnerable,
JAMMING Task
PE Vulnerable,
None
JAMMING Task
None
PE Vulnerable,
JAMMING Task, Popup Threat, Abort
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Operator
Task
System
Startup
Takeoff/Climb out

Pod Power up

Pre-planned
Jamming
Pre-planned
Jamming
Jamming
Jamming
Pop-up Threat

TABLE B-2: DAG 2 STANDOFF JAMMING WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT TASKS AND
FAILURES
(REFERENCE 10)

Workload
Assessment

Task Level

TLX
1

2

3

4
DAG 2

2
5

6

7

8

Task Set
System start-up,
Initialization, BIT
Establish Situational
Awareness (task that
would typically be
performed
during Take-off,
Departure, Climb-out,)
System Monitor, COMM,
Pre-Push, Join-up, Climb,
Ingress, System Monitor,
Pre Vulnerable
JAMMING Task
Pre-Vulnerable, PreEmptive JAMMING

Introduced Failures

Operator Task

None

System Startup

EMI, MIDS
Degradation, No
Failures

Take-off/Climb out

COMM, EMI, MIDS
Pod Power up
Degradation, Air to Air,
BIT No
Failures
COMM, EMI, MIDS
Pre-planned Jamming
Degradation,
Air-to-Air, System
Monitor, with
Recoverable Failure
Pre-Vulnerable, PreCOMM, EMI, MIDS
Pre-planned Jamming
Emptive JAMMING
Degradation,
Air-to-Air, System
Monitor, with
Recoverable Failure
Pre- Vulnerable,
COMM, EMI, MIDS
Jamming
JAMMING Task
Degradation, Air-toAir, System Monitor,
with Failures
PE Vulnerable,
COMM, EMI, MIDS
Jamming
JAMMING Task
Degradation, Air-toAir, Video Record,
System Monitor, with
Failures
PE Vulnerable,
COMM, EMI, MIDS
Pop-up Threat
JAMMING Task, Pop-up Degradation, Air-to-Air,
Video Record, System
Threat, Abort
Monitor, with Failures
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TABLE B-3: DAG 3 LEVEL 1STANDOFF JAMMING WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT TASKS
(REFERENCE 10)
Workload
Assessment

Task Level

TLX
1

2

3

4

DAG 3

Level 1

5

6

7

8

9

10

Task Set

Introduced Failures

System start-up,
Initialization,
BIT
Establish
Situational
Awareness,
System monitor
Pre-push, Joinup, Climb,
ingress, System
Monitor, PreVulnerable
Jamming Task
Set-up
Pre-vulnerable,
Pre-emptive
HARM, PreEmptive
Jamming
Pre-Vulnerable,
Pre-Emptive
JAMMING,
Reactive
JAMMING
PE Vulnerable,
JAMMING Task

PE Vulnerable,
JAMMING Task

PE Vulnerable,
JAMMING Task,
Reactive HARM
Post-Vulnerable,
JAMMING Task

Post-Vulnerable,
JAMMING Task,
A/A
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Operator Task

No Failures

Start-up

COMM, EMI, MIDS
Degradation, with
failures

Take-off,
Departure,
Climb-out

COMM, EMI, MIDS
Degradation, Air to Air,
BIT No Failures

Join-up with
Strike Package

COMM, EMI, MIDS
degradation, Air-to-Air,
System Monitor, with
jamming source failures.

Pre-Emptive
HARM

COMM, EMI,
Pre-emptive
MIDS Degradation, Air-to- Jamming
Air, System Monitor, with
No Failures
COMM, EMI, MIDS
Degradation, Air-to-Air,
System Monitor, with
Source Failure
COMM, EMI, MIDS
Degradation, Air-to-Air,
Video Record, System
Monitor, No Failures
COMM, EMI, MIDS
Degradation, Air-to-Air,
Video Record, System
Monitor, No Failures
COMM, EMI, MIDS
Degradation, Air-toAir, Video Record, System
Monitor, with No Failures
COMM, EMI, MIDS
Degradation, AirtoAir, Video Record, System
Monitor, Source Failure

Reactive Jamming

Jamming

Pop-up Threat
Reactive HARM
Shot
Post vulnerable

Air-to-Air Threat

TABLE B-4: DAG 3 LEVEL 2 STANDOFF JAMMING WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT TASKS
(REFERENCE 10)
Workload
Assessment

Task Level

TLX
1

2

3

4

5

DAG 3

Level 2
6

Task Set
System start-up,
Initialization, BIT,
MDB Reload
Establish
Situational
Awareness System
Monitor
Pre-Push, Join-up,
Climb, Ingress,
System Monitor,
Pre Vulnerable
JAMMING Task
Set-up
Pre-Vulnerable,
Pre-Emptive
HARM, PreEmptive
JAMMING
Pre-Vulnerable,
Pre-Emptive
JAMMING,
Reactive
JAMMING
PE Vulnerable,
JAMMING Task

PE Vulnerable,
JAMMING Task
7

8

PE Vulnerable,
JAMMING Task,
Pop-up Threat,
Reactive HARM
Post-Vulnerable,
JAMMING Task

9

10

Post-Vulnerable,
JAMMING Task
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Introduced Failures
No Failures

Operator Task
Start-up

COMM, EMI,
Take-off,
MIDS Degradation, with Departure,
No Failures
Climb-out
COMM, EMI, MIDS
Degradation, Air to Air,
BIT with Power Failure.
(Rolex 5)

Join-up with
Strike Package

COMM, EMI,
Pre-Emptive
MIDS Degradation, Air- HARM
to-Air, System Monitor,
with Source Failure
COMM, EMI,
Pre-emptive
MIDS Degradation, Air- Jamming
to-Air, System Monitor,
with Source Failure
COMM, EMI, MIDS
Degradation, Air-to-Air,
System Monitor, with
Source Failure
COMM, EMI, MIDS
Degradation, Air-to-Air,
Video Record, System
Monitor, with Source
Failure

Jamming

COMM,
EMI, MIDS Degradation,
Air-to-Air, Video Record,
System Monitor, with
No Failures
COMM, EMI, MIDS
Degradation, Air-toAir, Video Record,
System Monitor, with
Power Failure
COMM, Air-to-Air
Engagement, Video
Record, System Monitor,
with Source Failure

Pop-up Threat
Reactive HARM
Shot

Jamming

Post vulnerable

Air-to-Air Threat

TABLE B-5: DAG 4 LEVEL 1 STANDOFF JAMMING WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT TASKS
(REFERENCE 10)
Workload
Assessment

Task
Level

TLX
1

2

3

4

5

DAG 4

Level 1

6

7

8

9

10

11

Task Set

Introduced Failures

On Deck, system start-up,
Initialization, BIT,
Establish Situational
Awareness, System
Monitor,
MATT, Resolve
Ambiguities
Pre-Push, Join-up, Climb,
Ingress, System Monitor,
Pre Vulnerable
JAMMING Task
Pre-Vulnerable, PreEmptive JAMMING

POD Load Fail
COMM, EMI, MIDS
Degradation

Operator Task
Start-up, with POD
failure
Climb-out
New MATT ID

COMM, EMI, MIDS
Pre-Push
Degradation, Air to Air, BIT
No Failures

COMM, EMI, MIDS
Pre-Emptive
Degradation, Air-to-Air,
Jamming
System Monitor, Coordinate Failed Jamming
Jamming Assignments due Source
to Aft Source Failure
Pre-Vulnerable,
COMM, EMI, MIDS
Pre-emptive
JAMMING
Degradation, Air-to-Air,
HARM shot
System Monitor, PrePlanned HARM with
Failures
PE Vulnerable,
COMM, EMI, MIDS
Air-to-Air Slide
JAMMING Task
Degradation, Air-to-Air
Threat (Avoidance), System
Monitor, with Source
Failure
Pre-Vul, Receipt of CAS COMM, EMI, MIDS
Receive CAS
Degradation, Air-to-Air,
message
System Monitor, with
Failures
Pre-Vul
COMM, EMI, MIDS
Record SOI
Degradation, Air-to-Air,
CCS SOI Record, System
Monitor, HARM Fail, with
Failures
Pre-Vul, Confirm
COMM, EMI, MIDS
CAS Setup
JAMMING Assignments Degradation, Air-to-Air,
(including CCS)
System Monitor, with
Failures
Pre-Vul, JAMMING
COMM, EMI, MIDS
HARM Pass HHO
Task, A/A
Degradation, Air-to-Air,
System Monitor, HARM
Fail pass HARM package to
wingman, Source Failure
PE Vulnerable,
COMM, EMI, MIDS
CAS Alignment
JAMMING Task
Degradation, Air-to-Air,
System Monitor, Source
Failure
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TABLE B-6: DAG 4 LEVEL 2 STANDOFF JAMMING WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT TASKS
(REFERENCE 10)
Workload
Assessment

Task
TLX
Level

Task Set

Introduced Failures

System start-up,
1 Initialization, BIT, MDB
Reload
Establish Situational
Awareness, System
2
Initialization and Monitor,
Ambiguity resolution
Pre-Push, Join-up, Climbout, Ingress, System
3 Monitor, Verify Jamming
Assignments, Resolve
ambiguities
Pre-Vulnerable, Confirm
Assignments (including
4
CCS) Jamming

DAG 4

Level 2

Operator Task

No Failures

Start-up

No Failures

Pre-push, Join up
resolve ambiguity

COMM, EMI, MIDS
Push
Degradation, Air to Air, BIT
with Antenna Failure

COMM, EMI, MIDS
Confirm
Degradation, Air-to-Air,
assignments, CCS
System Monitor, with
threats
Antenna Failure
PE-Vulnerable, Jamming, COMM, EMI, MIDS
Pre-emptive
Pre-Planned HARM
Degradation, Air-to-Air,
HARM shot
5
System Monitor, with
Antenna and Source
Failure
PE Vulnerable, Jamming COMM, EMI, MIDS
ID, Record SOI
Task, ID and Record SOI Degradation, Air-to-Air,
6
System Monitor, with
Antenna and Source Failure
PE Vulnerable, Jamming COMM, EMI, MIDS
Big Dog
Task, ID Abort Threat
Degradation, Air-to-Air,
7
Video Record, System
Monitor, with Antenna and
Source Failure
Pre-Vulnerable, Receive COMM, EMI, MIDS
Receive CAS
CAS and Load route,
Degradation, Air-to-Air,
8
Receive HARM package System Monitor, with
Antenna and Source Failures
PE Vulnerable, HARM, COMM, EMI, MIDS
Pop-up threat,
Jamming Task
Degradation, Air-to-Air,
Reactive HARM
9
System Monitor, with
shot
Source Failure
A/A Leaker ID
COMM, Engage Air-to-Air, A/A Intercept,
10
System Monitor, with
AMRAAM shot
Antenna and Source Failures
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Appendix C: WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE QUESTION
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The following questionnaire is an example taken from the workload assessments
performed (Reference 10).
2. Establish Situational Awareness (task that would typically be performed during Takeoff, Departure, Climb-out,) System Initialization and Monitor, Ambiguity resolution,
COMM, EMI, MIDS Degradation, with No Failures.
Describe your performance criteria for this task.

Circle one of each of the paired workload factors.
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2. Establish Situational Awareness (task that would typically be performed during
Take-off, Departure, Climb-out,) System Initialization and Monitor, Ambiguity
resolution, COMM, EMI, MIDS Degradation, with No Failures.
On the scale of 1 through 10, rate (mark) the magnitude of each workload
factor. Use the modified Bedford Cooper-Harper rating scale (below) and
the example definitions (left) to form your response.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Low tasking, safe, can
accept additional tasks
without impacting
existing tasks.
Minimal tasking, safe,
can accept additional
tasks without impacting
existing tasks.
Light tasking, safe, can
accept additional
taskings with minimum
impact to existing
taskings.
Moderate / Comfortable
tasking, safe, can
accept additional
tasking and complete
all tasks with reduced
revisit time.
Moderate / pressured
tasking, safety slightly
impacted, additional
tasks will impact
/degrade existing tasks.
High tasking, safety
impacted, things
beginning to drop out of
scan, additional tasking
will significantly
degrade new and
existing tasks.
High tasking, safety
secondary
consideration,
additional tasking will
override or replaced
some existing tasks.
Very high tasking,
safety not factored into
tasks completion,
additional tasks cannot
be accepted without
major degradation to all
existing tasks.
Saturation tasking,
safety not considered,
scan breaking down,
additional tasking will
impact mission
accomplishment.
Total saturation
tasking, scan and task
sharing breakdown,
fixation on task at hand,
survival instincts take
over.

1

2

3
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4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2. Establish Situational Awareness (task that would typically be performed during
Take-off, Departure, Climb-out,) System Initialization and Monitor, Ambiguity
resolution, COMM, EMI, MIDS Degradation, with No Failures.
Ratings Summary

Scale
Mental
Physical
Temporal
Effort
Performance
Frustration

Weighted Rating
Weight
Raw

Adjusted Rating

Sum of Adjusted
Weighted

If any of your ratings were “4” or greater, please describe the cause.
Consider:
• Design/Mechanization
• Scenario
• Training/Proficiency
• Simulator Anomalies
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Appendix D: USE CASE EXAMPLE
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73
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Appendix E: CRITICAL MISSION TASKS
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The following information was obtained from the EA-18G Human Engineering Crew
Vehicle Interface Report, reference 10.

Mission Analysis/Decomposition
(EA-18G Critical Task Identification)
Mission Tasking
1. Review Air tasking Order (ATO) - Created by CAOC and intelligence
2. Review Air Plan---CV Airwing Operations generated document
3. Review Flight schedule - Squadron generated document using information from the
Air Plan
4. Strike lead generates Strike (mission) plan
5. Element leads generate individual sub-mission plans
Mission Planning
6. Aircrew coordinate with intelligence to develop a mission plan using the following
considerations:*
a. Required weapons based on theater threat
b. Site, System, and Emitter mission planned MDB
c. Coordinated SEAD and Strike group routes, timing, positioning
d. Develop waypoints, safe areas, and geographical restrictions
7. Element leads integrate mission plans into overall Strike plan
8. CAG approves entire strike plan. Strike lead responsible for understanding all
individual elements
Mission Briefings
9. All aircrew, intelligence, and CV Operations personnel attend mass strike brief
10. SEAD, DEAD, and EA aircrew attend SEAD element brief.
11. Individual crews brief their mission roles
Pre-Flight/Before Engine Start
12. Aircrew review aircraft maintenance log
13. Aircrew check out tapes / data cards / classified material
14. Aircrew don flight gear
15. Aircrew “walk” to aircraft 45 minutes prior to launch.
16. Aircrew receive pass down from previous pilot and plane captain
17. Aircrew man crewstations.
18. Aircrew load encrypted radio (assume EA-6B)
19. Aircrew “zeroize” encrypted radio. Ground crew re-keys radio. (assume EA-6B)
20. Aircrew close cockpit canopies
21. Aircrew receive flight deck, air boss, and strike instructions
Engine Start
22. Start engines 30 minutes prior to launch
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Before Taxi
23. Aircrew ensure MDBs load, computers are BITed and “up”
24. Aircrew check aircraft engines and controls
25. Aircrew power up and op-check AEA systems*
26. Aircrew initiate a POD identification and ensure communication with the AEA
system*
27. Aircrew check in with element lead; Aircrew check in with strike lead
Before Taxi/Before Takeoff
28. Taxi to directed catapult
29. Take off
After Take Off
30. Climb to required altitude.
31. Check out through Strike and Red Crown
32. Make necessary “burn out” jamming assignments and “burn” transmitters out in order
to check status*
33. Turn on Master RAD*
Air Refueling
34. Turn off Master RAD*
35. Fly to tanker (if required)
36. Rendezvous on tanker
37. Refuel to top off tanks
Prior to Rendezvous Pt/Combat Checks
38. Depart Tanker
39. Rendezvous with strike group, check in as fragged
40. Optimize AEA jamming assignments*
a. Ensure accuracy, steering, priority, Protected Entity*
41. Conduct EMCON procedures as briefed
42. Minimize radio activity
43. Execute mission plan, phase transitions, and jammer gameplan*
44. Verify Stores (weapons programs)*
Push
45. Push on time
46. Listen for appropriate Code words / monitor proper MIDS NPG
47. Master RAD on per strike brief/mission plan*
48. Broadcast appropriate code words at appropriate times*
49. Evaluate/manage incoming emitters* **
50. Resolve Ambiguous emitter activity **
51. Be alert for pop-up threats* **
52. Monitor timeline*
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53. Monitor and fix transmitter power problems*
54. Constantly evaluate go/no-go criteria*
55. Monitor transmitter steering and power output*
56. Fly mission planned course*
57. Listen for appropriate Code words*
58. Employ Weapons* **
a. Air to Ground
b. Air to Air
Post Combat Checks
59. Master RAD off*
60. Go through RTB (Return To Base) waypoints
61. Return to tanker as fragged
62. Pods on standby*
63. Have wingman conduct battle damage checks on aircraft
64. Pre landing checks (items included but not limited to: pod power to “off”, all
unnecessary boxes off, etc.)*
65. Go through carrier group check points
66. Check in with Red Crown and Strike
Marshall
67. Marshall overhead at appropriate altitude during the day, or assigned marshall
location at night.
Before Landing
68. In marshall, adjust gross weight if necessary (dump fuel), hook down
69. Pass maintenance codes to maintenance
70. Conduct landing checks (e.g. landing gear down, hook down, harness locked, etc.
These checks can be found in
current E/F books.)
71. Land
72. OK 3 wire arrested landing
After Landing
73. Come to stop and follow flight deck handler directions.
74. Once chocked and chained secure engines or begin hot refuel.
75. Exit aircraft and conduct post-flight inspection of aircraft
Post Flight/Debriefing
76. Pass down important information to relief aircrew
a. Debrief time sensitive Intel information
77. Crew goes to maintenance*
a. Debrief time sensitive maintenance information
78. Get out of flight gear
79. Debrief Operations*
a. Inform Ops of time sensitive info
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b. Inform Ops of flight time and mission/training accomplishments
80. Return tapes/data cards to the ready room
81. Attend Element Debrief
Attend Strike debrief
82. Attend Crew debrief
* EA-18G Human Engineering Essential Mission Tasks = Tasks that if not properly
completed within specified criteria
could result in degraded mission effectiveness.
** EA-18G Human Engineering Mission Critical Tasks (typically involve HOTAS) =
Tasks that if not properly completed
within specified criteria result in mission failure.
Note: Time and accuracy criteria for EA-18G Human Engineering Mission Essential and
Human Engineering Mission
Critical tasks are documented in the individual EA-18G Use Cases.
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